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Moving Forward from the Scoop Era:
Providing Active Efforts Under the Indian
Child Welfare Act in Illinois
CASSANDRA CRANDALL*
This Comment argues that Illinois should adopt the view that active efforts are a higher standard than reasonable efforts and implement procedures encouraging state agencies and courts to implement these requirements. Following the Supreme Court’s rationale in Mississippi Choctaw
Band of Indians v. Holyfield, one of the only Supreme Court cases addressing the ICWA, this Comment argues that a uniform definition and application of “active efforts” should exist in every jurisdiction. Furthermore, this
Comment emphasizes that “active efforts” require more than “reasonable
efforts,” and that these standards are different. Part I of this Comment reviews the history of the ICWA. Part II of this Comment examines the Congressional hearings concerning the ICWA to establish Congress’ intent
when passing the legislation more than thirty years ago. Part III examines
the 1979 Guidelines promulgated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Part IV
examines the evolution of case law regarding the ICWA. Part V discusses
the application of active efforts in state courts, with an examination on the
variation between jurisdictions. Part VI reviews the 2016 release of new
Guidelines for the ICWA by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Part VII discusses
current challenges to the constitutionality of the ICWA and criticisms the
active efforts standard has recently received. Part VIII makes recommendations to remedy the current shortage of guidance surrounding “active efforts” in section 1912(d) of the ICWA by examining the active efforts guide
produced by Wisconsin under the Wisconsin Indian Child Welfare Act.

_____________________________________________________________
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2020, and Symposium Editor of the Northern Illinois
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my faculty advisor, for her essential guidance throughout the research and writing process of
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for giving me the opportunity to research this topic in a practical setting and for encouraging
my interest in the ICWA. Lastly, I would like to thank my husband, William Crandall, and
son, Ian Crandall, for their unwavering support throughout law school.
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The scoop was the term that we use because the children’s
administration and other agencies were allowed to come into our tribal communities and literally scoop as many children as they could and take them quickly far from our reservations and place them for adoption . . . . My mother, Karen, was taken during that era from my grandmother, Myrtle. My grandmother, she had to go into the hospital for
surgery and while she was in the hospital my mom and her
siblings were taken. They separated them immediately and
put them in separate cars . . . . The Superior Court judge
signed off on the paperwork within a matter of four days
and said that my grandmother was morally unfit to raise her
children. There was no explanation given after her children
were taken. Some things never healed in her and she left
the reservation. She was murdered on the streets of Tacoma. She was 38.1
Historically, state courts have exercised jurisdiction over issues in
family law.2 Federal courts, in most cases, have left the resolution of do-

1. The National Indian Child Welfare Association, The Heart of ICWA: Becky,
YOUTUBE (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tYMG13pKq4Y.
2. Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the
States, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 269 (2009).
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mestic relation disputes up to state legislatures and courts.3 This is due to
the expertise of state courts and the federal court system’s dislike in deciding family law issues.4 Nevertheless, in 1978, Congress passed
the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA” or “Act”) to address the alarming
rate of separation of Indian children from their families and tribes.5 The
purpose of the Act was,
to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their families and the placement of
such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect
the unique values of Indian culture.6
However, not all state courts have accepted the implementation of the Act.
In fact, some state courts have pushed back against the ICWA because of
their traditional jurisdiction over family law matters.7 Unfortunately, this
has resulted in a patchwork of state violations of the ICWA.
Preliminarily, a short explanation of some of the Act’s provisions may
be beneficial. The ICWA applies to Indian child custody proceedings.8
“Child custody proceedings” refers to adoptive placement proceedings, the
termination of parental rights, and foster care placement.9 The Act defines
an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and
is either (1) a member of an Indian tribe or (2) is eligible for membership in
an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member/citizen of an Indian
tribe.”10 An “Indian tribe” is defined by the Act as “any Indian tribe, band,
nation, or other organized group or community of Indians federally recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their status as Indians.”11
3. Id.
4. Bradley G. Silverman, Note, Federal Questions and the Domestic Relations
Exception, 125 YALE L.J. 1364, 1391-92 (2016).
5. About ICWA, NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N, https://nicwa.org/abouticwa/ [https://perma.cc/2KBE-QFPL].
6. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978).
7. Elizabeth MacLachlan, Comment, Tensions Underlying the Indian Child Welfare Act: Tribal Jurisdiction over Traditional State Court Family Law Matters, 2018 BYU
L. REV. 455, 455 (2018) (“From the early years of the existence of the United States, states
have struggled against the sovereignty of Indian tribes. Instead of accepting tribes as third
sovereigns, as the federal government dictates, states often view tribal jurisdiction as an
intrusion into state authority.”).
8. 23 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2016).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.

2019]

MOVING FORWARD FROM THE SCOOP ERA

103

Since the Act passed, the Supreme Court has heard a limited number
of cases involving the ICWA, leaving state courts and tribal courts mostly to their own devices to interpret the various terms and standards within
the Act.12 This Comment focuses on a small portion of the ICWA, section
1912(d), which states:
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under
State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have
been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.13
Today, the definition of active efforts fluctuates depending on the jurisdiction. Some courts in states like California and Colorado treat active
efforts the same as reasonable efforts, the standard used in proceedings that
do not involve the ICWA.14 Other states, like Alaska and Wisconsin, believe that the active efforts language in section 1912(d) requires more than
just reasonable efforts.15 Nevertheless, even among the majority of states
that hold that active efforts require something more do not agree on what
those efforts entail. Currently, Illinois case law has not established a distinction between active efforts and reasonable efforts.
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978
My mother, Karen, went to live with this family. It was a
very abusive home. She found herself pregnant with me at
a very young age and was sent away. They still had Catholic-run schools for unwed girls. She was forced to sign papers to give me up for adoption and she ran away from that
place and never went home. She carried that brokenness
with her out onto the streets, which is where she lived. She
was unseen and unheard and never allowed to come home
because of those systems that were in place to keep us from
our communities.
I was taken at birth and placed in a foster home and I can
remember the day my social worker came to collect me and

12. See Ogle infra note 63.
13. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1978).
14. In re Michael G., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); People ex rel. K.D.,
155 P.3d 634 (Colo. App. 2007).
15. See A.A. v. Dept. of Family & Youth Servs., 982 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1999); State
v. Debra F., 2005 WI App 88, 695 N.W.2d 905.
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take me to meet my prospective parents. I was not quite
four. I remember meeting these strange people, non-native
folks. They oohed and awed over me and in less than a
week my things were packed. It was the 70s and there was
no ICWA in place to protect me. My adopted mother was
very abusive to me physically. My adoptive father, he was
very abusive to my mother . . . I think that my life would
have been very different if ICWA had been available or in
existence at the time of my forced adoption.16
Before the enactment of the ICWA, there was no existing legislation
governing the adjudication of child placement cases involving Native
American children and families.17 Native American tribes have sovereignty
over their lands and their affairs; however, this was not always the case.18
Before the 1970s, there were policies in the United States that ranged from
implementing reservations for tribes to even terminating tribes.19 These
policies changed during the 1970s when the Nixon administration implemented policies to further the self-determination of Native American
tribes.20 Self-determination was a mixture of legislation and ideologies,
which focused on providing Native Americans with the right to self-govern
and to make crucial decisions regarding their tribe’s affairs on their own.21
Congress enacted the ICWA in 1978 during the era of selfdetermination. The Act sought to address the “wholesale separation of Indian children from their families.”22 Legislative testimony taken from all over
the country confirmed that many county and state child-welfare agencies
and workers, with the authorization of many state courts and some “Bureau
of Indian Affairs officials, had engaged in the systematic, automatic, and
across-the-board removal of Indian children from Indian families and into
non-Indian families and communities.”23
16. National Indian Child Welfare Association, supra note 1.
17. See Wendy Therese Parnell, Comment, The Existing Indian Family Exception:
Denying Tribal Rights Protected by the Indian Child Welfare Act, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
381, 382-84 (1997).
18. Allison E. Davis, Note, Roadway to Reform: Assessing the 2015 Guidelines and
New Federal Rule to the Indian Child Welfare Act’s Application to State Courts, 22 SUFFOLK
J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 91, 95 (2016).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978).
23. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Origins of the Indian Child Welfare Act: A Survey
of Legislative History, MICH. STATE U. COLL. L. INDIGENOUS L. & POL’Y CTR. (April 10,
2009), https://www.law.msu.edu/indigenous/papers/2009-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FKDBUSE]. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989).
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During this time, between 25% to 35% of all Indian children, nationwide, were removed by state government actors.24 State agencies placed
about 85% to 90% of these children in non-Indian homes.25 During the
1974 legislative hearings, witnesses testified about the removal of Indian
children “without due process of law.”26 Social service agencies and courts
made decisions to place Indian children in foster care with “few standards
and no systematic review of judgments by impartial tribunals.”27 A Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe member in South Dakota testified that “state
actors had taken Indian children without even providing notice to their families, with state courts then placing the burden on the Indian parent to prove
suitability to retain custody.”28
Mel Tonasket, the President of the National Congress of American Indians, testified that “a state caseworker came to an Indian woman’s house
without warning or notice and took custody of an Indian child by force.”29
After hearing Mr. Tonasket’s testimony, Senator James Abourezk stated,
welfare workers and social workers who are handling child
welfare caseloads use any means available, whether legal
or illegal, coercive or cajoling or whatever, to get children
away from their mothers they think are not fit. In many
cases they were lied to, given documents to sign and they
were deceived about the contents of the documents.30
One of the most shocking aspects of the removal of Indian children is
the reasons given for separation. Indian children were removed due to abuse
in only 1% of cases.31 In the other 99% of cases, children were removed for
neglect or social deprivation.32 Social workers were uninformed about tribal
24. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978).
25. Meagan Flynn, Court Strikes Down Native American Adoption Law Saying it
Discriminates Against Non-Native Americans, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2018, 7:07 AM)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/10/10/court-strikes-downnative-american-adoption-law-saying-it-discriminates-against-non-nativeamericans/?utm_term=.901e48f3f34f [https://perma.cc/2ZAA-WSJD].
26. Problems that American Indian Families Face in Raising their Children and
How These Problems are Affected by Federal Action or Inaction: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Second Session, 93rd Cong. 11, at 21 (1974).
27. AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE CHILDREN AND MENTAL HEALTH:
DEVELOPMENT, CONTEXT, PREVENTION, AND TREATMENT 270 (Michelle C. Sarche et al. eds,
2011) (ebook).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Kathleena Kruck, Note, The Indian Child Welfare Act’s Waning Power After
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 445, 449 (2015).
32. Id. at 450.
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culture and familial norms.33 This lack of knowledge often led to claims of
neglect and abandonment being founded simply because children were
raised outside of a traditional family structure.34 However, in many tribes, it
is ubiquitous for children to have many relatives care for them.35
To solve the problem, Congress designed the ICWA to provide minimum procedural and substantive safeguards for Indian children, tribes, and
families in state adjudicative forums.36 The Act provides that “[a]n Indian
tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody
proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the
reservation of such tribe.”37 The idea was adopted from a common-law decision from the Western District of Michigan.38 The Michigan court had
reached the same outcome in 1973 in a case involving members of the
Hannahville Indian Community.39 Now, the Act presumes that tribal courts
have “concurrent” and “presumptive” jurisdiction over child custody cases
involving Indian children, even if the child is domiciled outside of Indian
Country.40
Under the ICWA, state courts must provide notice to both the Indian
child’s tribe and parents if a state agency is petitioning for foster care
placement or the termination of parental rights.41 If out-of-home placement
is ordered, the state court must give preference to the Indian child’s extended family or another tribal community placement.42 Further, the state actor
seeking the termination of parental rights must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the continued custody of the child by the Indian parent is likely
to result in severe emotional or physical damage to the child.43
The adoption of these protections was ground-breaking. For possibly
the first time in federal Indian law and policy, Congress recognized the
impact that state law and policy had on the future of Indian tribes, children,
and families. Congress found “that there is no resource that is more vital to
the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and
that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1978).
37. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1978).
38. Wis. Potawatomies of Hannahville Indian Cmty. v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719,
734 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
39. Id.
40. 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1978).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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children who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe.”44
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF THE
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

The requirement that state child-welfare agencies provide active efforts before the termination of an Indian parent’s rights to their children
resulted from the testimony that state actors rarely had, if ever, competently
provided services to Indian families before removing children from the
home.45 The term active efforts in the framework of rehabilitative state services to children and families is “unique in American law.”46 Due to its
origin, and the purpose of the ICWA, the term active efforts has a distinctive character that focuses on the cultural norms of Indian families.47
Initially, the ICWA did not define the term active efforts.48 However,
the legislative history of the provision supports that Congress wanted state
courts and agencies to actively and affirmatively provide Indian children,
parents, and families with rehabilitative services, not merely make those
services available.49 Comparing the two proposed drafts of the active efforts
provision is illuminating. Initially, the first version of the statute did not use
the term active efforts. Instead, the provision of the bill used the phrase
“made available.”50 The original subsection read:
No placement of an Indian child, except as provided in the
Act shall be valid or given any legal force and effect . . .
unless . . . the party seeking to effect the child placement
affirmatively shows that available remedial services and
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of
the Indian family have been made available and proved unsuccessful.51

44.
45.
46.

25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978).
Id.
AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE CHILDREN AND MENTAL HEALTH:
DEVELOPMENT, CONTEXT, PREVENTION, AND TREATMENT, supra note 27, at 271 (citing Mark
Andrews, Active Versus Reasonable Efforts: The Duties to Reunify the Family Under the
Indian Child Welfare Act and the Alaska Child in Need of Aid Statutes, 19 ALASKA L. REV.
85, 87 (2002)).
47. Id.
48. S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 4 (1977).
49. See infra note 53.
50. S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 4.
51. Id. at 1.
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However, on October 14, 1978, the final version of the bill read:
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under
State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have
been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.52
The change is significant. The legislature decided to move away from
mandating that services be “made available,” and require that state actors
make active efforts. In 1997, Congress stated that the active efforts language was specifically intended to remedy the “wholesale separation of
Indian children from their families.”53 This distinction supports the conclusion that there is a difference between states providing passive efforts and
active efforts.
Further, the testimony heard at the 1977 hearings supports the assertion that active efforts was meant to be a higher standard. One of the most
significant issues that led to the enactment of the ICWA was many states’
failure to provide adequate services to Native American families within the
child-welfare system.54 Several other witnesses at the hearings testified
about the failures of state actors to provide services to Native American
families.55 A social worker from Albuquerque who worked directly with the
Bureau of Indian Affairs testified that “State local governments sluff off
their responsibilities to Indians, often by bureaucratic technicalities and
thereby avoid providing meaningful services.”56 It was also common for
Indian families to consent to the mass enrollment of their children into
boarding schools.57
52. 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1978).
53. S. REP. NO. 105-156, at 9 (1997) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978)).
54. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. 53 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Hearings].
55. See id. at 53-56, 76-80, 152-53.
56. Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong. 214 (1974) (statement of
Evelyn Blanchard, Assistant Area Soc. Worker, Bureau of Indian Affairs).
57. Ann Piccard, Death by Boarding School: “The Last Acceptable Racism” and
the United States’ Genocide of Native Americans, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 137, 151-52 (2013) (“In
1879, the federal government undertook to destroy all Native American culture by sending
Indian children, forcibly when necessary, to day or boarding schools. The Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) was responsible for the boarding schools . . . . A former BIA Secretary
acknowledged his agency’s role in the boarding schools’ efforts to eradicate the Native
Americans: ‘This agency forbade the speaking of Indian languages, prohibited the conduct
of traditional religious activities, outlawed traditional government, and made Indian people
ashamed of who they were. Worse of all, the Bureau of Indian Affairs committed these acts
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Other issues arose due to the passivity of state agencies.58 It was not
uncommon for caseworkers to wait until Indian families reached a point of
crisis before intervening, only to initiate termination of parental rights.59 In
support of this, the Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, Calvin Isaac, testified that states could have preserved Indian families
if active efforts had been offered in time, or at all: “Often the situation
which ultimately leads to the separation of the child from his family . . . is
one which could be remedied without breaking up the family. Unfortunately, removal from parental custody is often seen as a simple solution.”60
Another issue recognized by Congress was the lack of services that fit
the cultural needs of Indian people. A 1976 report to the American Indian
Policy Review Commission concluded that “[n]on-Indian public and private
agencies . . . show almost no sensitivity to Indian culture and society.”61
Nancy Amidei from the United States Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare testified that a twenty-one-state study conducted by her department found a “need to encourage States to deliver services to Indians
without discrimination and with respect to tribal culture.”62
Ultimately, the issues brought up in the testimony and debates leading
to the enactment of the ICWA support Congress’ intent in enacting the active efforts provision. Before a state can order the breakup of an Indian
family, the party moving for termination of parental rights must demonstrate that the state actually provided rehabilitative and preventative services to the Indian family.
III.

THE RELEASE OF THE 1979 GUIDELINES AND THE SUBSEQUENT
CONFUSION AMONG THE STATES

In conjunction with the enactment of the ICWA, Congress required the
Secretary of the Interior to, “[w]ithin one hundred and eighty days after the
against the children entrusted to its boarding schools, brutalizing them emotionally, psychologically, physically, and spiritually.’”).
58. 1977 Hearings, supra note 54, at 137-38. (“Generally, non-tribal government
agencies practice crisis intervention. Aware in the incipiency of the presence of factors that
frequently lead to family breakup, the agencies often passively observe the corrosive effect
to these factors and intervene only when disintegration has reached the point of crisis to seek
the legal separation of children from their families. Remedial and rehabilitative services are
generally not made available to the Indian family in distress.”).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 156.
61. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM., REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE, AND
TRIBAL JURISDICTION 87 (1976).
62. S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 23 (1977); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs and Public Lands of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 57
(1978).
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enactment of this Act, . . . promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.”63 The Bureau of Indian
Affairs (the “BIA”) was tasked with drafting the guidelines.64 However, the
BIA read this provision as solely granting it the authority to disseminate
regulations where the ICWA “expressly delegate[s] to the Secretary the
primary responsibility for interpreting a statutory term.”65 Accordingly, the
BIA’s 1979 regulations were nonbinding and only addressed specific areas.
Unfortunately, the resolution’s many gray areas within the statute were left
up to statutory interpretation by state courts.66
The BIA did not believe that Congress had intended to grant it rulemaking authority where the Secretary of the Interior was not clearly implicated.67 Furthermore, the BIA took the position that applying any more regulatory authority with the ICWA than Congress had expressly given would
be a violation of federalism principles and Congress’ intent.68 Instead, the
BIA followed the process detailed by the Administrative Procedures Act for
rulemaking.69
Unfortunately, the 1979 Guidelines left many provisions of the ICWA
up to state interpretation, including the active efforts provision.70 The
vagueness of the ICWA and the 1979 Guidelines left the interpretation of
the meaning of active efforts up to the states. Some state court decisions
referenced the Guidelines, while others viewed the Guidelines as assisting
but not as binding.71 State courts’ reliance on the BIA’s 1979 statement was
not only foreseeable, but it was also expected. The BIA predicted this reliance by remarking that “[s]tate and tribal courts are fully capable of carrying out the responsibilities imposed on them by Congress without being
under the direct supervision of this Department.”72

63. Kasey D. Ogle, Comment, Why Try to Change Me Now – The Basis for the
2016 Indian Child Welfare Act Regulations, 96 NEB. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (2018) (citing 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1963 (2012)).
64. Id.
65. Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child Custody Proceedings,
44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (Nov. 26, 1979).
66. Ogle, supra note 63.
67. Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child Custody Proceedings,
44 Fed. Reg. at 67,584.
68. Ogle, supra note 63, at 1011-12.
69. Id. at 1012.
70. Tribal Reassumption of Jurisdiction Over Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.
Reg. 45,095 (July 31, 1979).
71. See Ogle, supra note 63, at 1012 (citing Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989)).
72. Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child Custody Proceedings,
44 Fed. Reg. at 67,584.
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ACTIVE EFFORTS IN STATE COURTS

After the BIA’s release of the nonbinding 1979 Guidelines for the
ICWA, state courts were tasked with interpreting many provisions of the
Act on their own.73 As a result, inconsistent law was created among the
states. This inconsistency undercut the effectiveness of the ICWA. Nationwide, Indian children are still disproportionately represented in childwelfare proceedings at twice the rate of the general population.74
When a State Agency takes a child into custody as a result of neglect
or abuse, the child's parents have rights under American law. Before the
State may permanently separate the parent and child, the State has a duty to
make “reasonable efforts” to try to reunify them.75 Reasonable efforts have
been described as “passive efforts.” For example, a case manager working
with the State may draft a service plan that includes counseling, parent education, daycare, emergency assistance and advocacy assessments, transportation to obtain services, and medical assistance.76 However, after the case
manager makes a referral for these services, it is usually up to the parent to
successfully complete the requirements of their service plan.77
Under Illinois state law, as well as the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, child-welfare officials are required to make reasonable efforts to
reunify families.78 The race or ethnicity of the child may alter the State’s
duty.79 When an Indian child is removed from her home, the State must
provide active efforts to reunify the family.80 Active efforts must be made
both before and after the removal of an Indian child from his or her home.
The active efforts requirement links directly to one of the Congressional
findings underlying the enactment of the ICWA (i.e., to curb “unwarranted
removals of Indian children from their homes”).81 Even though some state
courts regard active efforts and reasonable efforts as synonymous, most
73.
74.

See Ogle, supra note 63, at 1011.
2017 Report on Disproportionality of Placements of Indian Children, NAT’L
INDIAN
CHILD
WELFARE
ASS’N
(2017),
https://www.nicwa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/Disproportionality-Table.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K5N-KEMK].
75. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/5 (2017).
76. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.2 (2011).
77. See Principles of Permanency Planning, ILL. DEP’T CHILDREN & FAMILY
SERVICES
§
315.200
(Aug.
21,
2018),
https://www2.illinois.gov/dcfs/aboutus/notices/Documents/Procedures_315.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U7ZD-CY3B].
78. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/5 (2017).
79. 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1978).
80. Id.
81. B. J. JONES & JOHN G. RICHARDSON, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: A
CULTURAL
AND
LEGAL
EDUCATION
i
(1997),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/173731NCJRS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HN5RDCET].
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have concluded that active efforts requires a heightened obligation to reunite Indian children with their families.82
Currently, no Illinois case law interprets the difference between active
efforts and reasonable efforts. However, a majority of jurisdictions have
held that active efforts is a more heightened standard than the reasonable
efforts standard.83 The Alaska Supreme Court confronted the issue of the
elusive definition of “active efforts” after a father moved to continue a hearing on a petition to terminate his parental rights with respect to his son, an
Indian child.84 The court in A.A. v. State, Dept. of Family & Youth, stated
that,
Passive efforts are where a plan is drawn up and the client
must develop his or her own resources towards bringing it
to fruition. Active efforts, the intent of the drafters of the
Act, is where the state caseworker takes the client through
the steps of the plan rather than requiring that plan be performed on its own. For instance, rather than requiring that a
client find a job, acquire new housing, and terminate a relationship with what is perceived to be a boyfriend who is a
bad influence, the Indian Child Welfare Act would require
that the caseworker help the client develop job and parenting skills necessary to retain custody of her child.85
After this ruling, other states seemed to follow the Alaska Supreme Court’s
ruling.86 However, there still was no consensus on what active efforts really
required.
On the other hand, California and some Colorado courts have both
held that active efforts and reasonable efforts are synonymous.87 California

82. See generally A.A. v. Dep’t of Family & Youth Servs., 982 P.2d 256 (Alaska
1999); In re P.S.E., 2012 SD 49, 816 N.W.2d 110; In re A.N., 2005 MT 19, 106 P.3d 556; In
re Walter W., 744 N.W.2d 55 (Neb. 2008).
83. In re P.S.E., 2012 SD at ¶ 18, 816 N.W.2d at 115.
84. A.A., 982 P.2d 256.
85. Id. at 261 (citing CRAIG J. DORSAY, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AND LAWS
AFFECTING INDIAN JUVENILES MANUAL 157-58 (1984)).
86. In re Nicole B., 976 A.2d 1039, 1042-43 (Md. 2009); In re D.A., 2013 MT 191,
305 P.3d 824; State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Yodell B., 2016-NMCA029, 367 P.3d 881; In re G.V., 2016 OK Civ App 6, 365 P.3d 89; State ex rel. C.D., 2008
UT App 477, 200 P.3d 194; In re JL, 770 N.W.2d 853 (Mich. 2009); In re Anhayla H.,
2018-NMSC-033, 421 P.3d 814; In re S.H.E., 2012 SD 88, 824 N.W.2d 420.
87. See In re Michael G., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); People ex rel.
K.D., 155 P.3d 634 (Colo. App. 2007). However, it is important to note that other Colorado
courts have refused to equate reasonable efforts with active efforts and have applied a
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courts have reasoned that the State holds a heightened view of reasonable
efforts.88 “[W]hile the court must make a separate finding under section
1912(d), the standard in assessing whether ‘active efforts’ were made to
prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and whether reasonable services
under state law were provided, are essentially undifferentiable.”89 Thus, the
two approaches are consistent; California law requires a higher burden in
all its child-welfare proceedings.90 Nevertheless, even though courts seem
to be moving towards recognizing that active efforts require a higher burden than reasonable efforts, historically, there has been little agreement as
to what active efforts actually entails.
V.

ICWA IN THE SUPREME COURT: TWO FORMATIVE CASES

Ten years after the release of the 1979 Guidelines by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Supreme Court heard its first case involving the ICWA,
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.91 The Holyfield court
acknowledged that terms under the ICWA, such as “domicile,” must have
nationwide, uniform application.92 Analyzing the meaning of domicile under the congressional intent of the ICWA, the court reasoned that the Act
was never meant to be left up to state interpretation.93
In Holyfield, a member of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians,
Jennie Bell, sought to place her child up for adoption.94 Jennie “was twentyfour years old, a single mother of two, and she was pregnant with twins by
a man who was married to another woman and had two children of his
own.”95 Ms. Bell sought to place the twins with Orrey and Vivian Joan
(“Joan”) Holyfield.96 She even moved into the Holyfield’s home temporarily to get to know them better.97 Ms. Bell gave birth in a hospital 200 miles
from the Choctaw reservation in December of 1985.98 Twelve days later,
she relinquished her parental rights.99 Subsequently, the Mississippi Band
heightened standard. See People ex rel. A.R., 2012 COA 195M, 310 P.3d 1007; In re T.E.R.,
304 P.3d 414 (Colo. App. 2013).
88. In re Michael G., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650.
89. Id.
90. C.F. v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456, 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
91. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
92. Id. at 30.
93. Id. at 41.
94. Id.
95. Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2008).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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of Choctaw Indians intervened because ICWA procedures were not followed by placing the children with the Holyfield family.100
Once the case reached the Supreme Court, four years later, the decision rested on whether the children were domiciled on the Choctaw reservation.101 If the children were domiciled on the reservation, then the ICWA
would apply to their adoption proceedings.102 In reaching its decision, the
Court looked to the legislative history of the ICWA in order to determine
Congress’ intent.103 Citing the 1978 House Report on the ICWA, the Court
argued that the purpose of the ICWA is to create “a Federal policy that,
where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community,” by
ensuring that “Indian child welfare determinations are not based on ‘a
white, middle-class standard which, in many cases, forecloses placement
with an Indian family.’”104 On top of the goal of establishing federal uniform standards, the Court stated that the ICWA was passed to restrict state
power.105 By examining “the very text of the ICWA” along with “its legislative history and the hearings that led to its enactment,” the court found
that “Congress was concerned with the rights of Indian families and Indian
communities vis-à-vis state authorities.”106
The Court held that the twins, as children of a Choctaw tribe member,
shared the domicile of their mother. Ultimately, the Choctaw Tribe was
granted jurisdiction to settle the adoption proceedings.107 On February 9,
1990, four years after the Holyfields brought the twins home from the hospital, the Choctaw Tribal Court granted Joan Holyfield’s adoption petition.108 “Based on the home study conducted by Choctaw Social Services
and the recommendation of the children’s guardian ad litem, [the Choctaw
Tribal Court] determined that it was the twins’ best interest to remain with
Joan Holyfield.”109
Twenty-four years after Holyfield reached the Supreme Court, another
controversial case involving the ICWA was decided. Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl involved a Native American father who sought to block the adop-

100. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 30 (1989).
101. Id. at 42.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 44.
104. Id. at 37.
105. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 60. The Holyfield Court also relied upon the testimony of
experts and studies that demonstrated the destructive effects of placing Indian children in
non-Indian families and communities.
106. Id. at 44-45. In other words, Congress perceived the states and their courts are
part of the problem it intended to correct with the passage of the ICWA.
107. Id. at 30.
108. Maldonado, supra note 95, at 121.
109. Id.
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tion of his child by a non-Native American family.110 The father argued that
he had not consented to the termination of his parental rights.111 The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that under the ICWA, the termination
of the father’s rights was barred by the statute.112
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision.113
The Court reasoned that the termination of the father’s parental rights was
not barred by the ICWA.114 Additionally, because the father was not seeking to adopt the child, the Act did not apply.115 The Court focused on the
purpose of the ICWA, to “prevent the ‘breakup of Native American families.’” In this case, the father had never established a parental relationship
and had ended his legal parental rights before the birth of the child.116
Therefore, the Act did not apply.117
The decision in Adoptive Couple significantly affected the application
of the ICWA. Even though the Court did not overturn the ICWA, restrictions on voluntary adoptions were created.118 Most importantly, the
case highlighted the gray areas within the statute. This controversial case
ultimately pushed the BIA to draft new guidelines and a new Final Rule, the
purpose of which was to help clarify the application of the ICWA for state
courts and agencies.119
VI.

THE RELEASE OF NEW GUIDELINES AND FINAL RULE IN 2016 BY THE
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS

It could be argued that the distinction between active efforts and reasonable efforts is blurred because every family in the child-welfare system
deserves the best support from the state agencies involved in their case. To
some, “active efforts” may seem “reasonable.” However, new Guidelines
clarify the distinction with a concrete list of minimal efforts to be provided.120 In 2016, The Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
110. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013).
111. Id. at 637.
112. Id. at 638.
113. Id. at 639.
114. Id.
115. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 639.
116. Id. at 641.
117. Id. at 638.
118. Dustin C. Jones, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: The Creation of Second-Class
Native American Parents Under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 32 LAW & INEQ. 421,
422 (2014).
119. Kevin Heiner, Note, Are You My Father? Adopting a Federal Standard for
Acknowledging or Establishing Paternity in State Court ICWA Proceedings, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. 2151, 2153 (2017).
120. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GUIDELINES FOR
IMPLEMENTING
THE
INDIAN
CHILD
WELFARE
ACT
§
E.4
(2016),
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issued Guidelines and a new binding Final Rule for State courts and agencies in Indian child custody proceedings.121 The updated Guidelines provide
“examples of best practices for the implementation of the statute, with the
goal of encouraging greater uniformity in the application of [the]
ICWA.”122
These Guidelines supersede and replace the 1979 Guidelines.123 Additionally, the new Guidelines expand their application from just state courts
to state courts and private child-welfare agencies.124 The Guidelines emphasize that active efforts may vary from case to case and must be tailored to
meet the needs of the family. Moreover, active efforts should be provided at
the earliest point possible.125
The 2016 Guidelines have now defined active efforts and detailed
what is required, at minimum, of a social worker when working with an
Indian family.126 The guidelines state that social workers should engage
“the Indian child and the Indian child’s parents, extended family members,
Indian custodians, and Tribe.”127 They encourage the identification of appropriate services to help “the parents to overcome barriers, including actively assisting the parents in obtaining such services.”128
Additionally, the Guidelines state that the social worker must take into
account “the prevailing social and cultural conditions of the Indian child’s
Tribe,” and that “[d]etermining the appropriate active efforts may entail
discussions with Tribal leadership, elders, or religious figures or academics
with expertise concerning a given Tribe as to the type of culturally appropriate services that could be provided to the family.”129 Under the Guidelines, the social worker must offer and employ “all available and culturally
appropriate family preservation strategies” and contact and consult with
“extended family members to provide family structure and support for the
Indian child and the Indian child’s parents.”130 Finally, the social worker
must also find community resources, “including housing, financial, transhttps://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ois/pdf/idc2-056831.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J9BP-KUDT] [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN
CHILD WELFARE ACT].
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, supra note
120, at 42.
126. Id. at 42-43.
127. Id. at 40.
128. Id. at 41.
129. Id. at 41.
130. GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, supra note
120, at 41.
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portation, mental health, substance abuse, and peer support services,” and
actively assist “the Indian child’s parents, or when appropriate, the child’s
family, in utilizing and accessing those resources.”131 These requirements
are only a selection from the Guidelines.
VII.
A.

FORTY YEARS LATER: CRITICISM OF THE ICWA

QUESTIONING THE ICWA’S CONSTITUTIONALITY

Following the release of the 2016 Guidelines and Final Rule, there has
been both praise and criticism for the new regulations about the ICWA. The
BIA Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, Kevin Washburn, stated that the
revised guidelines will be valuable in helping to promote Congress’ intent
behind the statute.132 However, the constitutionality of the ICWA has been
called into question, the matter having been ruled on with differing results.133 In October of 2018, the Northern District of Texas issued a decision regarding the Act in Brackeen v. Zinke.134 The Brackeen court challenged the constitutionality of the ICWA and the 2016 Final Rule. The district court ultimately held that the Act and the new rule were unconstitutional.135
The lawsuit was initially brought by a non-Indian foster family and the
State of Texas.136 The foster family, the Brackeens, had an American Indian
child placed with them.137 The foster family had initiated adoption proceedings and sought to deviate from the placement preferences required under
the ICWA, but their petition was denied.138 Shortly after, the Texas Attorney General filed a lawsuit alleging that the 2016 Guidelines and the ICWA
were unconstitutional.139
Ultimately, the Texas court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Brackeens.140 The court’s decision relied on viewing the ICWA as a law
131. Id. at 41.
132. Suzette Brewer, BIA Releases New ICWA Guidelines to Protect Native Families
and Children, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 26, 2015),
https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/bia-releases-new-icwa-guidelines-toprotect-native-families-and-children-rleRwA5LMkqWwo5d4Fh1Mw/
[https://perma.cc/B8VT-GNJU].
133. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018); Nat’l Council for
Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 (E.D. Va. 2015); In re T.A.W., 383 P.3d 492
(Wash. 2016); In re Alexandria P., 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
134. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 518-19.
135. Id. at 519.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 525.
139. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 525.
140. Id. at 519.
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that discriminates on the basis of race.141 The Brackeens, along with six
other families and the State of Texas, Louisiana, and Indiana, argued that
the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and exceeded Congress’ authority under the Indian Commerce
Clause.142 Additionally, the court ruled that the ICWA violated the Tenth
Amendment, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and challenged portions of the
Final Rule by arguing that they violated the Administrative Procedure
Act.143 This decision was a stark contrast to the two United States Supreme
Court cases that have upheld Congress’ interest in legislating Indian affairs.144
However, on August 9, 2019, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court’s ruling that granted summary judgment in favor of the Brackeens,
holding that provisions of the ICWA and the Final Rule do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the Nondelegation Doctrine, or the Administrative Procedure Act.145 First, the most significant
aspect of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling was its denial of the claim that the ICWA
is a “race-based” law.146 Notably, the court stated, “If these laws, derived
from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians,
were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United
States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”147
Historically, Native American tribes have been seen as sovereign nation-states within the country.148 The precedent has been set by the Constitution, federal law, and hundreds of years of treaties; the federal government has jurisdiction over Indian affairs.149 Under this authority, the ICWA
has been legislated. Therefore, any fair reading of the ICWA must treat
“Indian” as a political rather than racial classification, and the ICWA cannot be subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection.150 To do otherwise is
to reject the history of tribal relations in the United States.

141. Id. at 533.
142. Id. at 530.
143. Id.
144. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989); Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 670 (2013).
145. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, No. 18-11479, 2019 WL 3759491, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug.
16, 2019), modified, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019).
146. Id. at *9.
147. Id.
148. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
149. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 552 (1974).
150. Allison Krause Elder, Note, “Indian” as a Political Classification: Reading the
Tribe Back into the Indian Child Welfare Act, 13 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 417, 438 (2018).
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Further, the court held that the special treatment of the Indian children
and families under the ICWA “is rationally tied to Congress’s fulfillment of
its unique obligation toward Indian nations and its stated purpose of ‘protecting the best interests of Indian children and promoting the stability and
security of Indian tribes.’”151 Additionally, the court rejected the argument
that the ICWA violated the anti-commandeering doctrine by requiring executive agencies to apply federal standards in state courts.152 The court recognized that the Supremacy Clause controls in this case.153 The Supremacy
Clause states that “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”154 The court noted the distinction between “a state court and its
political branches,” acknowledging that even though federal statutes may
“direct state judges to enforce them . . . this sort of federal ‘direction’ of
state judges is mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause.”155
Moreover, the court rejected the argument that the ICWA violated the
Nondelegation Doctrine.156 The ICWA gives Indian tribes the power to
change preferred placement for an Indian child through tribal resolution.157
The district court argued that this gives tribes the power to change legislative preferences with binding effect on the states, since the tribes are not
part of the federal government, they cannot exercise this power.158 However, the Fifth Circuit ultimately rejected this argument by stating that “[t]he
Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress may incorporate the laws
of another sovereign into federal law without violating the nondelegation
doctrine.”159 The Supreme Court has established Indian Tribes’ rights to
regulate their internal and social relations.160 Thus, allowing tribes to have a
say in the placement of their children does not infringe on the Nondelegation Doctrine.
Finally, The Fifth Circuit found that the 2016 Final Rule is still valid
and does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act.161 The court stated
151. Brackeen, 2019 WL 3759491, at *12.
152. Id.
153. Id. at *12-14.
154. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
155. Brackeen, 2019 WL 3759491, at *13 (quoting New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992)).
156. Id. at 17.
157. 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1978).
158. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 536 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
159. Brackeen, 2019 WL 3759491, at *16.
160. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 533, 564 (1981); Merrion v. Jacarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 170
(1982).
161. Brackeen, 2019 WL 3759491, at *20.
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that first, Congress unambiguously granted the Department authority to
promulgate binding rules, and second, the BIA’s current interpretation of its
authority to issue binding regulations was reasonable.162 Initially, the district court ruled that since the BIA had reversed its position on the scope of
its authority to issue binding regulations, without an explanation, its interpretation was not entitled to deference.163
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit disagreed.164 The court stated that “[t]he
mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency position is
not fatal. Sudden and unexplained change, or change that does not take account of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation, may be arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of discretion.”165 The agency must provide “reasoned
explanation” for its new policy though “it need not demonstrate to a court’s
satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons
for the old one.”166 Finally, “[i]t suffices that the new policy is permissible
under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates.”167
The Fifth Circuit looked to the BIA’s statement in the text of the 2016
Final Rule.168 About its shift in ideology, BIA stated that the agency “had
neither the benefit of the Holyfield Court’s carefully reasoned decision nor
the opportunity to observe how a lack of uniformity in the interpretation of
the ICWA by state courts could undermine the statute’s underlying purposes.”169 Ultimately, Congress had intended for the ICWA to address a nationwide problem and leaving the interpretation of these provisions up to
state courts created severe problems with uniformity.170 In promulgating the
rule, the BIA “relied on its own expertise in Indian affairs, its experience in
administering [the] ICWA and other Indian child-welfare programs, state
interpretations, and best practices, public hearings, and tribal consultations.”171 Thus, the court concluded: “the BIA’s current interpretation is not
‘arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion’ because it was not sudden
162. Id. at *20-21.
163. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 545.
164. Brackeen, 2019 WL 3759491, at *20-21.
165. Id. at *18 (citing Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742
(1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
166. Id. (citing F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)
(internal citations and quotations marks omitted)).
167. Id. (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at 515 (internal citations and
quotations marks omitted)).
168. Id. at *19.
169. Brackeen, 2019 WL 3759491, at *19 (citing Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 37,778 (June 14, 2016)).
170. Id. at *17.
171. Id. at *19.
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and unexplained.”172 This decision is an essential step in the right direction
for preserving the ICWA and its protections. The Fifth Circuit thoroughly
articulated the ICWA’s constitutional protections. However, advocates
should be wary of further attacks on the Act and developments in case law.
B.

CRITICISM OF THE ICWA’S ACTIVE EFFORTS REQUIREMENTS

Additionally, the requirement to provide active efforts under the
ICWA has also been criticized.173 Critics have argued that because most
courts have ruled that active efforts are more stringent than reasonable efforts, the circumstances that would typically relieve a state of the requirement to reunite a family would not be satisfied.174 One article stated, “[t]his
means that while officials are not required to reunify a non-Indian child
with a family after she is removed due to parental substance-abuse problems, or physical or sexual abuse, such a duty does exist with regard to Indian children.”175
However, the congressional intent behind requiring active efforts was
to provide Indian children with procedural and substantive protections.176
Requiring child-welfare agencies to provide active efforts is not outcome
determinative in a case. If parties and child-welfare agencies try to circumvent the required procedures under the ICWA, higher courts applying the
Act will make those entities go back and follow the protocol. Overall, it is
important to note that the purpose of the ICWA is to provide reparations for
the actions taken by the government against Native Americans.
VIII.

MOVING BEYOND THE SCOOP ERA: THE INCORPORATION OF
ACTIVE EFFORTS

With the goal of moving toward uniformity and consistency, the 2016
Guidelines and Final Rule are meant to help state courts and agencies apply
the ICWA.177 The Final Rule defines active efforts as “affirmative, active,
thorough, and timely efforts intended primarily to maintain or reunite an

172. Id.
173. Timothy Sandefur, Escaping the ICWA Penalty Box: In Defense of Equal Protection for Indian Children, 37 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 36 (2017) (“ICWA’s ‘active efforts’
provision is so poorly designed that it often has the perverse effect of exposing Indian children to a greater risk of abuse or neglect, and frequently results in delaying or denying protection children need.”).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 37.
176. Id.
177. GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, supra note
120.
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Indian child with his or her family.”178 The ICWA requires state actors to
make active efforts in cases involving an Indian child in two areas. First,
the state must provide services to the Indian family to prevent the removal
of the child from his or her parent or custodian.179 Second, state actors must
work to reunify an Indian child with his or her parent or custodian after
removal has occurred.180 Further, early and active participation and consultation with the Indian child’s tribe is crucial in providing active efforts.181
The ICWA was meant to function as reparation and should be treated as
such in all case planning decisions.
Even though some states have been criticized for failing to follow the
ICWA provisions, other states have strived to achieve compliance with the
Act. In 2005, the State of Wisconsin was failing to apply the ICWA properly.182 Statistics indicated systemic and persistent issues with implementing
the Act in state court proceedings.183 In 2008, a coalition comprised of tribal attorneys, tribal social services directors, Indian rights advocates, representatives of the state, and several Native American tribes was formed in
order to develop the Wisconsin Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA).184 The
coalition addressed some of the issues that were created by some of the
gray areas within the ICWA and sought to clarify the problematic clauses in
a way that was consistent with the original congressional intent behind the
ICWA.185 Wisconsin’s model and active efforts guide is trail-blazing and
focuses explicitly on how state actors can be more culturally sensitive. Illinois should look to Wisconsin as a model for ensuring the requirements
under the ICWA are met.
Wisconsin drafted its active efforts guide in 2013.186 Similar to the
BIA Guidelines that were released in 2016, the Wisconsin guidelines list
nine specific activities for what active efforts should look like.187 These
nine activities include: (1) request that representatives of the Indian child’s
178. 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2016).
179. GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, supra note
120, at § E.1.
180. Id. at 39.
181. Id.
182. Susan Reetz, Missing Threads: The Story of the Wisconsin Indian Child Welfare
Act, YOUTUBE (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCLUbS4FxWo.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. WIS. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, A CHILD WELFARE PRAC. GUIDE FOR
MEETING
THE
WICWA
ACTIVE
EFFORTS
REQUIREMENT
(Dec.
2013),
https://dcf.wisconsin.gov/files/publications/pdf/464.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M66G-V35U]
[hereinafter A CHILD WELFARE PRAC. GUIDE FOR MEETING THE WICWA ACTIVE EFFORTS
REQUIREMENT].
187. Id.
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tribe assist in developing the case plan; (2) complete a comprehensive assessment of the Indian child’s family; (3) identify, notify, and invite representatives of the Indian child’s tribe to participate throughout the proceedings; (4) identify and consult with extended members of the Indian child’s
family; (5) arrange to provide natural and unsupervised family interaction;
(6) provide all available family preservation strategies; (7) actively assist or
offer active assistance in accessing community resources to the child’s family members; (8) monitor client progress and participation; and (9) consider
alternative ways of addressing the Indian child’s family’s needs.188
Involving representatives of the Indian child’s tribe in the development
of a case plan is extremely important in order to identify “traditional and
customary support, actions, and services.”189 Tribal representatives have
substantial knowledge of social and cultural standards for child-rearing
within the tribal community.190 By involving members who are familiar
with the family’s needs, courts can ensure that state actors are not making
decisions based on cultural misunderstandings.191 For instance, “it is a
common belief for Ho-Chunk families that you do not buy anything for an
expectant mother until after the baby is born.”192 This cultural misunderstanding “has led to referrals being made on Ho-Chunk families by nontribal service workers expressing concern that the mother is not preparing
for the birth of her child.”193 Increased communication between tribes and
state agencies about cultural norms can help ensure that tribal families’
needs are met.194
State agencies should comprehensively assess the Indian child’s family and identify in-home safety options.195 Wisconsin’s active efforts guide
urges caseworkers to be in contact with the Indian child’s tribe as soon as
they become aware of the child’s connection to a particular tribe.196 However, there are no federally recognized Indian tribes of Illinois today, nor
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189. WICWA Online Resource for Case Workers, WIS. CHILD WELFARE PROF’L DEV.
SYS.,
https://media.wcwpds.wisc.edu/foundation/WICWA_Online_Resource/efforts.html [https://
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are there any Indian reservations.197 With tribes located out of state, distance can be a common issue for Native American families. The Wisconsin
active efforts guide recommends that the caseworker still regularly call the
tribal representative and keep him or her updated on the case progress.198
The Wisconsin active efforts guide emphasizes the importance of identifying, notifying, and inviting members of the Indian child’s tribe to participate in the child custody proceeding as early as possible.199 Tribal members and other members of the extended family can serve as an important
resource for determining the needs of the child. Many Native American
tribes have culturally different family structures.200 Sometimes, tribes will
assign different types of responsibility to extended family members during
child-rearing.201 In some tribes, uncles and aunts are also considered to be
parents of a child, and they would be the first option for the child to live
with if something happened to the child’s biological parents.202 Further,
other tribes view the uncle as the person to provide spiritual guidance or
discipline to the child.203 If caseworkers did not reach out to these extended
family members, it is possible that this essential connection to the child’s
culture could be lost in translation.
Additionally, the extended family members of the child should be consulted with in order “to identify and provide family structure and support
for the Indian child, to assure cultural connections, and to serve as placement resources for the Indian child.”204 These family members can be extremely helpful in assisting during parent-child interaction. Additionally, if
a court cannot place an Indian child with a family member, the state should
try to locate an Indian foster family for the child. A common barrier for
Indian children entering foster care, in Illinois and nationwide, is the small
number of Native American foster families. Developing programs to recruit
Native American foster families could be a proactive way to prevent the
cultural ties of a Native American child in foster care from being broken.205
197. Federal and State Recognized Tribes, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURES
(Oct. 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/state-tribal-institute/list-of-federal-and-staterecognized-tribes.aspx [https://perma.cc/WR9U-PAVP].
198. WICWA Online Resource for Case Workers, supra note 189.
199. A CHILD WELFARE PRAC. GUIDE FOR MEETING THE WICWA ACTIVE EFFORTS
REQUIREMENT, supra note 186.
200. WICWA Online Resource for Case Workers, supra note 189.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Recruiting Families for Native American Children: Strengthening Partnerships
for Success, NAT’L RESOURCE CTR. FOR DILIGENT RECRUITMENT AT ADOPTUSKIDS (Mar.
2015),
http://www.nrcdr.org/_assets/files/NRCDR-org/recruiting-families-for-nativeamerican-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYX8-73G8].
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Further, the Wisconsin active efforts guide states that the court and social services should identify “community resources offering housing, financial, and transportation assistance and in-home support services, in-home
intensive treatment services, community support services, and specialized
services for members of the Indian child’s family.”206 It is important to remember that many times, families within the child-welfare system are families in crisis. Poverty, substance abuse, and mental illness can often create
many barriers to accessing necessary services. Social services agencies
must not only provide information about community resources to Indian
families, but they should also actively assist them in accessing the resources.207
Many barriers could prevent families from satisfying the requirements
imposed by state agencies. Not having access to a phone could prevent a
family from being able to schedule appointments that are necessary for their
treatment plan.208 Further, not having access to a car, especially if the family lives in a rural area that lacks the infrastructure of public transportation,
could make attending required appointments difficult, if not impossible.209
The Wisconsin Online Resource for Caseworkers states that “[i]t is up to
the county [or] state caseworker to assist in overcoming these barriers by
assisting in scheduling appointments and arranging transportation.”210 The
Wisconsin Online Resource for Caseworkers goes on to describe a case
involving a mother who “had isolated herself from extended family.”211
After her child had been in out-of-home care for eighteen months, the assigned tribal worker convinced the grandmother to join a family team.212
Along with the child’s grandmother’s support, “the mother was able to reconnect with her family, make positive changes, and was reunified four
months later.”213
Finally, the active efforts guide stresses that the court should consider
“alternative ways of addressing the needs of the Indian child’s family… if
services did not exist or if existing services were not available to the family.”214 Some have criticized the child-welfare court system as providing
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“boilerplate” treatment plans.215 When an Indian child comes before the
court during a child custody proceeding, state actors must tailor the remedial efforts to fit the needs of the child and the family.216 It is especially important to focus on services that support the cultural needs of the child.
Ultimately, the purpose of the ICWA was to prevent abuses by state
actors and the courts in the removal of Native American children from their
families and communities. The BIA Guidelines were groundbreaking.
However, it is not only important to recognize the legal distinction between
active efforts and reasonable efforts; courts and child-welfare agencies must
understand the practical difference as well. Illinois can implement meaningful changes by not only recognizing the difference between active efforts
and reasonable efforts, but also promulgating educational materials and
implementing training for the state actors that handle cases involving Native American children and families. The Wisconsin legislature recognized
the deficiencies within its child-welfare system and worked to remedy the
situation. The Wisconsin active efforts guide serves as a great example of
how state actors can work to ensure that an Indian child’s best interests are
met.
CONCLUSION
The assaults on our communities and against our children,
it continues today. When our children are lost, they languish in care. The disproportionality of the numbers of our
children who are in extended care, who do not return home,
are horrific and wrong and ICWA is in place to protect us
from that. Sometimes people say that the issue is too complex and when I hear that word, I think about my mother
dying. I think about my grandmother being murdered. I
think about my great-grandparents, and I think about our
ancestors that have prayed for us, as children, as greatgrandchildren, and as far down as they could think ahead.
What ICWA brings to our communities is the hope that our

215. See, e.g., Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: General, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay], 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 601
(1997) (“Instead of offering meaningful assistance, caseworkers too often take a cookie
cutter approach to the families and their problems.”); Kathleen A. Bailie, The Other Neglected Parties in Child Protective Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of Lawyers
Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285, 2319 (1998).
216. GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, supra note
120, at 42-43.
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children are going to be connected to us and not lost to us
forever.217
For almost forty-one years, the ICWA has served as a critical protection for Native American families and children. The Act has been described
as the gold standard in child-welfare policy.218 The BIA’s release of a Final
Rule and new Guidelines in 2016 was a step in the right direction for
providing justice to Indian children. However, the work is not over. State
courts and agencies should work for uniform application and cultural sensitivity when applying the ICWA.
The future of the ICWA is currently at a crossroads. While many support the purpose of the ICWA, there are also those who greatly oppose it.
Overall, attorneys, judges, and social services workers should be mindful
that the new ICWA Rule does exist and it is binding. Within the coming
years, more changes to the ICWA will likely occur. The different applications of the ICWA among state courts is an issue that is evolving, for those
working in state courts and those who are interested in Indian affairs. However, for now, courts and practitioners within Illinois should be aware of the
new rules and the requirement for active efforts.
The 2016 Guidelines and Final Rule are a significant departure from
the ways of the past. It is an attempt to right old wrongs and ensure justice
by establishing uniformity. However, just as history has demonstrated, the
laws are only successful if appropriately applied. While the Guidelines provide that active efforts, rather than reasonable efforts, should be utilized, a
number of states, like Illinois, have applied their typical reasonable efforts
standards in ICWA cases and commentators have noted that many attorneys, judges, and child-welfare officials are either unaware that the ICWA
uses a different standard or they believe that the difference is unimportant.219 The ICWA may never be a model of perfect state compliance.
Nevertheless, steps can be taken to improve compliance and remedy the
issues created when the ICWA is not followed. Illinois should recognize
that the new Guidelines and Final Rule were created with Native American
children and families in mind, and the processes within the rules must be
followed to achieve tangible benefits and results.
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